Commissioner of Police v Buntin et Al

• Jurisdiction: Montserrat
• Court: High Court (Montserrat)
• Judge: Georges, J.
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1992
• Neutral Citation: MS 1992 HC 1
• Docket Number: 62 of 1992
• Date: 01 January 1992

High Court

Georges, J.

62 of 1992

Commissioner of Police

and

Buntin et al

Equity - Right of Subrogation — Issue of ownership of vehicle — Rights of vehicle (equitable rights of subrogation) had passed to plaintiff who was thus entitled to the subject matter of the policy — Interpleader proceeding to determine the right of the parties to the substantive issue of stake — O. 17 r. 5 1(b) — Security for costs — Plaintiff does not necessarily have to state case — Car stolen from original owner — Owner can always claim it from an innocent purchaser who bought it from a mercantile agent — Plaintiff having fully indemnified the original owner for loss by theft is by virtue of this equitable right of subrogation entitled to the car.

1 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: By an ordinating summons filed on 3rd July, 1992, the plaintiff herein applied under Order 17 Rule 1 of the Rules at the Supreme Court an order that the issue as to the ownership of motor vehicle registration number M281 be divided between the first and second defendants.

2 The circumstances giving rise to this interpleader issue are set out in paragraph 1 to 7 of the supporting affidavit which read as follows:–

1

I am the Commissioner of Police of the Royal Montserrat Police Force 2. On the 12th day of July 1991 I wrote to the 1st defendant asking her to take Motor Vehicle registration No. M281 to Police Headquarters Plymouth Montserrat for examination. 3. Upon examination of the said Motor Vehicle registration No. M281 on the 13th day of July, 1991 it was found that the said Motor vehicle was the vehicle that was reported stolen in England on the 20th day of September 1987 from Wrightson Wood Limited of 11 Grosvenor Place London. 4. That the said Motor Vehicle M281 was detained by me on the said day 13th day of July 1992 in connection with enquiries with a charge of theft of the said Motor Vehicle and in connection with a charge of handling stolen goods relating to the said vehicle. 5. I have been advised by letter dated 20th day of May 1992 and signed by J. Coles, Branch Crown Prosecutor and I verily believe that a criminal charge is pending against one Samuel Ryan at the Snaresbrook Crown Court in England in relation to the theft of Motor Vehicle registration No. M281. A copy of the said letter is annexed. 6. The second named defendant group have made a claim to me asserting that they are the true owners of Motor Vehicle No. M281 and that they are also entitled to possession of the said vehicle. 7. The first named defendant has made claim to the said vehicle upon the ground that she is a bona fide purchaser for value in good faith of the said vehicle.

3 Affidavits in support of the second defendant's claim were duly filed by Robert K. Kadwell an insurance adjuster of Caribbean Insurance Adjusters on 29th July, 1992 end John Wall, Manager of W. Llewellyn Wall & Company Limited the local agent of the second defendant company.

4 An affidavit in reply to the originating summons was filed on 31st July, 1992 by the first defendant and also by one Austin Lapps of Antigua.

5 On 31st July, 1992 the court ordered that the issue proceed to trial on the basis of the affidavits filed by or on behalf of the respective parties and that the second defendant be constituted as plaintiff and the first defendant as defendant for that purpose.

6 Mr. James, solicitor for the plaintiff insurer submitted that the plaintiff(s claim was based on the exercise of its equitable right of subrogation. Having fully indemnified the original owner of the motor car (hereinafter referred to as “the insured”) on 20th January, 1988 for loss by theft of the insured vehicle, the plaintiff was thereby subrogated in equity to all the rights of the insured and was entitled to the subject matter of the policy.

7 On payment of full indemnity to the insured, it was argued that as a matter of equity the rights to recover against third persons passed from the insured to the insurer although the legal right to compensation remained in the insured and not the insurer.

8 Mr. Allen for the defendant contended that the rights to which an insurer are subrogated must be enforced in the name of the insured and the there fact of subrogation did not entitle the insurer to enforce such rights in its own name. Therefore in the absence of a formal assignment of such rights to the insurer by the insured, the plaintiff had no locus standi in the matter it was argued.

9 The fallacy of that argument is that in the nature of things, an interpleader issue is not an action as such but a proceeding in an action or a potential action. The plaintiff in these proceedings is not bringing an action against the defendant as such. The “interpleader” is merely a method to enable the court to determine the claims between two persons and to decide those claims so that the person interpleading will get the relief to which he is entitled. The objection taken by Mr. Allen cannot therefore be sustained in my opinion.

10 Thus minors have been claimants in interpleader proceedings without joining their next-of-kin and so too have beneficiaries in their own right without naming trustees. As long as both claimants have a substantive claims the jurisdiction of the court can be invoked.

11 The position is fully exemplified in the judgment of Greene, L.J. in the Court of Appeal decision of DE LA RUE v. HENRU PERON & STOCKWELL LTD [1936] 2 All E.R. 411 where the plea that as a husband could not (as a general rule) sue his wife, an order made by a master, on an interpleader summons, constituting the husband as plaintiff and the wife as defendant, to have the ownership of goods decided, was bad was rejected. After reviewing the history and nature of interpleader proceedings, the court was clearly of the opinion that such...