Meade v Morson

• Jurisdiction: Montserrat
• Court: High Court (Montserrat)
• Judge: Redhead, J.
• Judgment Date: 23 March 1993
• Neutral Citation: MS 1993 HC 3
• Docket Number: 80 of 1991
• Date: 23 March 1993

Meade

and

Morson

Redhead, J.

80 of 1991

Court of Appeal

Contract — Insurance claim — Plaintiff, a minor, was a passenger in vehicle which was involved in a vehicular accident — Splinter of glass was embedded in her eye — Before splinter removed plaintiff accepted sum of money “in full and final satisfaction…of all claims, costs and expenses” — Plaintiff signed release to insurance company — Whether release valid — whether payment to a minor of the whole claim is a sufficient answer to a further claim — Whether payment was full payment on claim.

Appearances:

Mr. Jean, Kelsick for the Plaintiff.

Mr. S. Barzey for the Defendant.

Redhead, J.

1 On 23 February 1990 the defendant was driving his motor car from Richmond Hill to Brambles Village. The plaintiff along with others was a passenger. In that motor car. On reaching the vicinity of the Lees Public Road the motor car was involved in an accident with another vehicle. The plaintiff was injured. A fragment of glass was embedded in her right eye. She was hospitalised for one week. While at the hospital she was treated by Dr. Sonia Meade who is not an eye specialist. While at the hospital she was also seen by visiting French Opthalmologists.

2 After her discharge from hospital here She went to St. Martin to see one Dr. Hilgers an eye specialist. The plaintiff consulted Dr. Hilgers but he was not Successful in the treatment of her problem as the fragment of glass still remained embedded in her eye. She returned to Montserrat. On 23 March 1990 the plaintiff visited Dr. Edwards in Antigua. He too was unable to help. the fragment of glass remained embedded in her eye.

3 The plaintiff next consulted Dr. Walwyn in Antigua in September 1990. She was then six months pregnant. According to the plaintiff, Dr. Welwyn advised her that because of her pregnancy it would be better if she waited until the birth of the child before she had an operation on the eye; As a result of that advice she saw Dr. Welwyn in April 1991 when he operated on her eye and removed the splinter of glass therefrom.

4 On 16 May 1990 the plaintiff was paid $6,928.00 — “in full and final satisfaction, liquidation and discharge of all claims, costs and expenses…… in respect of loss, injuries or damage sustained whether now or hereafter to become manifest whether directly or indirectly arising from the above accident which occurred at Lees.”

5 The plaintiff signed a release to the Insurance Company. She was at the time nineteen (19) years old. The assessment of the claim was done by Mr. Kenneth Allen who at the time represented the Insurance Company, the defendant's insurers. Liability is not an issue. Two issues fail to be considered here (1) whether the release was a valid one and (2) if not, what quantum of damages should the plaintiff receive.

6 It was put to the plaintiff in cross-examination that she was pressing to have her claim settled. This she denied. It was even suggested to her that Mr. Allen was actually discouraging her from pursuing the claim at the point in time because Mr. Allen pointed out to her that at that point she could not be sure what her full claim was. This she denied. Finally, if was suggested to the plaintiff that she was pressing for the settlement of her claim because she wanted to repay her father, Nymphus Meade, money which he had loaned her to travel to St. Martin in seeking medical attention. Again she denied this. Having been and heard Mr. Allen I am in no doubt that the plaintiff was less than frank with the Court on this issue.

7 Mr. Allen said in evidence that the Plaintiff was pressing to have the claim settled. Mr. Allen said in evidence:

“Before assessing damages the plaintiff was waiting outside with her father. When it was her turn to come in she did so; but he did not. I could see him through the window leaning on the rails outside. I asked her, “Why do you want to have your claim settled so quickly? Why do you not wait until you tire absolutely certain that your eye is better?” She told me that her father had loaned her the money to go to St. Martin and he wanted his money. These were her exact words.”

8 In addition Mr. Allen in a letter to the Insurance Company dated 11 May, 1990, advising the Insurance about the claim said in his final paragraph:-

“It is remarkable however, that the claimant is pressing for a settlement of her claim before ascertaining whether there would be any long term effects.”

9 It is in my view that the plaintiff was pressing to have her claim settled and was therefore untruthful. But this in my view cannot affect her position on the question of quantum of damages or whether she had the legal authority to give the release. I now turn to that question.

10 As stated above the plaintiff is 19 years old. At Common Law one is an Adult when one attains 21 years. In Montserrat the Common Law applies.

11 In MacGillivery on Insurance Law 4th Edition at paragraph 1323 it is there stated:

“At common law the contract of an infant, that is, a person under 21 years of age, is, according to the nature of the contract — (1) void (2) enforceable by either party (3) or voidable by the infant.

12 Practically, all contracts of and deeds of an infant relating to insurance such as contract, of insurance, the assignment…… or settlement of the policy are contracts within the last category, and are therefore voidable by the infant at Common Law.”

13 At paragraph 1333 the learned authors say:

14 Where money such as policy money becomes payable to an infant who is beneficially entitled to it, caution must be observed in making the payments. In so far as the infant's right in equity to receive the money is concerned, payment to him, upon his own receipt, of the whole claim is a sufficient answer to any further claim by him or his representatives. But an infant cannot give a legal discharge. If he is the person legally entitled to sue, the company should not pay to him until he is of full age, because if they were to pay on his sole receipt as an infant that receipt would be no answer to some other claimant who had an equitable charge.”

15 Strictly speaking this is not “policy money”, But in this case the plaintiff received the payment from the Insurance Company did consequence of the defendant being insured with the company and the plaintiff being injured as a result of the defendant's negligent driving.

16 By extension of reasoning the above quoted passage would apply to the instant case. In other words, I cannot see any difference where on the one hand one receives money from an insurance company as a result of premiums being paid to that insurance company on that person's behalf and on the other hand someone...